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From the late 1990s through 2007, the US biotechnology industry was booming. According to 
Ernst & Young’s annual global biotechnology reports (www.ey.com/beyondborders), measured 
in 2007 dollars, US biotechnology revenues increased steadily from $19.3 billion in 1996 to 
$68.4 billion in 2007, while R&D spending in the industry increased from $10.4 billion in 1996 
to $30.0 billion in 2007. In 1996 the industry had 1,287 biotech firms, of which 294 were 
publicly listed; and in 2007 1,502 companies, of which 386 were publicly listed. In the interim, 
at least 128 US venture-backed biotech companies were acquired by established companies. 
Year-end employment in the US biotechnology industry was, not counting biotech employees in 
traditional “Big Pharma” companies, 118,000 in 1996 and 192,700 in 2007.   
 
Yet, as Gary Pisano has shown in his 2006 book, Science Business: The Promise, the Reality, 
and the Future of Biotech, over its 30-year history the profitability of the biopharmaceutical (BP) 
industry as a whole has been low. Product development in the BP industry can cost up to $2 
billion over a time-frame of 10-20 years, with highly uncertain prospects for a commercial 
product. Nevertheless, at least until the financial crisis of 2008, the BP industry has received 
large amounts of business funding from private equity, R&D contracts, M&A deals, and initial 
public offerings. Why have venture capitalists, big pharma, and public investors been investing 
so heavily in an industry in which profits are so difficult to generate?  The research project on 
which the proposed paper will be based seeks to answer this question, and in the process provide 
a basis for understanding the sustainability of innovation in the US BP industry, including how 
the industry will adapt to the current financial crisis. 
 
This project focuses on the modes of financing the US biotechnology industry that have 
supported the formation and growth of innovative biopharmaceutical (BP) enterprises. The 
research for this project constitutes a financial history, brought up to the present, of a leading US 
high-technology industry.  It integrates the role of finance with our knowledge of BP innovation.   
 
The project provides new insights into the ways in which public policy – for example, drug-rpice 
regulation, or sharing of the costs of and gains from innovation between business and 
government – can support or undermine high-tech innovation in the United States. In a period of 
financial instability in which the BP industry remains a strength of the US economy, it is 
important to ensure that US financial regulations and institutions promote innovative investments 
that result in drugs that people need at prices that the healthcare system can afford.  
 
Finance is a vital but often neglected topic in research on the innovation process. Committed 
finance is needed to sustain a cumulative and collective process of transforming technology and 
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accessing markets from the time investments in productive resources are made until the time that 
financial returns are generated. Research on the finance of innovation seeks to identify the 
sources of committed finance and the conditions under which it remains committed to the 
innovation process until new commercial products become available at affordable prices. 
Financial commitment cannot be taken for granted. Under certain economic conditions and in the 
presence of certain types of financial institutions, those with financial claims on the innovative 
enterprise may be able to extract value in ways that undermine the innovation process. 
 
In this project, the “finance of industry” is broadly construed to include not only equity 
investments and securities issues, but also retentions out of profits, government investments in 
physical infrastructure and the knowledge base, and government subsidies. Our proposed paper 
will examine the roles of investments in the knowledge base by the National Institutes of Health 
and government subsidies under the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 in providing a foundation for 
business-sector investment. In particular we will analyze the determinants of commercial success 
of the 31 “blockbuster” BP drugs to date.  
 
The proposed paper will summarize our results in three research areas: 1) cost of drug 
development, 2) financing of entrepreneurial startups, and 3) financial behavior of established 
BP companies. In each case, we seek to identify the institutional and organizational 
arrangements that support or undermine investments in the drug development process by 
observing BP business strategies and decisions.  By constructing a series of historical case 
studies of the finance of BP drug development, our research identifies the different parties in 
government and business who have borne the burden of these costs. We are building a database 
of the 336 private equity-backed biotech IPOs that, according to Venture Xperts, have taken 
place in the United States from 1979 through 2007. For the first time in any calendar year, given 
a dampening of stock market speculation, there were no BP IPOs in 2008). This database will 
enable us to determine, among other things, whether and to what extent the biotech IPOs that 
have been more lucrative for pre-IPO investors have ultimately been the most successful in the 
development of commercial products. We are also building a similar database on M&A deals in 
biotech, going back to 1986.  
 
Our research on the financial behavior of established corporations analyzes the impact of an 
orientation toward maintaining the value of a company’s stock price, particularly through stock 
buybacks, on that firm’s innovative capability and product development. Among big pharma, in 
the period 2000-2007, Merck did buybacks equal to 57 percent of R&D expenditures, Pfizer 82 
percent, and Johnson & Johnson 60 percent. When the substantial dividends issued by big 
pharma companies are added to their repurchases, the ratio of distributions to shareholders to 
R&D expenditures for 2000-2007 shoots up to 148 percent at Merck, 148 percent at Pfizer, and 
116 percent at Johnson & Johnson. Meanwhile, Amgen, the largest dedicated BP firm, did $20.3 
billion in repurchases over this period, an amount that was $98 million more than it spent on 
R&D. Genentech, the second largest DBF, did $6.6 billion in repurchases in 2000-2007, 
equivalent to 83 percent of the funds that it spent on R&D. We compare R&D efforts and 
innovative outcomes of BP companies that are large stock repurchasers with those that are not. 
Through this research, we address the central policy issue of whether higher drug prices in the 
United States than abroad are warranted by the need for BP companies to spend on R&D.   
